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CHAPTER TEN
FISCAL REGULATION
Changes in the American constitutional system are as clearly
registered in the relationship of church and state as in any other area.
Conflicts arising out of the changing legal status and moral condition
of the church within the larger community are especially evident with
respect to three issues: property, education, and church autonomy.

A

Fundamentalist attorney, David Gibbs, has summarized the issues as
follows: who owns the church, who owns the children, and who owns the
land?

1

The very starkness of these questions directs attention

immediately to the basic perceptions about jurisdiction that help shape
the public agenda of the nation.

Regardless of the cordiality or

animosity that may color personal relations between church and state
officials, the terms of discourse are set by underlying religious and
political beliefs about authority.
The first question--who owns the church?--goes directly to the
heart of the age-old conflict.

On the surface, it is simply a question

of title: who owns the buildings, the pews, the endowments, or the real
estate?

But more importantly, it is a constitutional question about

sovereignty that has serious legal and practical implications for the
church.

Changes in fiscal policies may do more to redefine the status

and role of the church in American society than all the regulatory
innovations in other policy areas combined.

Much of the current
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controversy centers on the stipulations attached to some church tax
exemptions.
Taxation, in fact, has a long history of regulatory uses.

2

For

example, some taxes are regarded as a means of promoting public health,
safety, welfare, morals, or peace.

High taxes on products considered to

be socially useless or harmful indulgences, such as tobacco and liquor,
are often justified as disincentives designed to suppress their demand.
In this respect, regulatory taxes have taken the place of the sumptuary
laws of earlier generations.

But far from remedying perceived moral or

social problems, their double function may be self-defeating.

Such

taxes give the state an economic interest in the products it regulates
and, at the same time, shift the tax burden to those who can least
afford it.

To the extent they succeed as revenue measures, they may

fail as regulatory devices.
Subsidies also provide an effective "conduit for regulation."

3

For

example, the strings attached to federal grants-in-aid are used to
promote national policy by encouraging state and local governments to
adopt a variety of new laws, procedures, programs, and other
.
t•lons. 4
lnnova

Similarly, if tax exemptions are defined as privileges

rather than immunities, they are equally susceptible to such regulatory
uses.
The Supreme Court has acknowledged that there are inherent dangers
in the power to tax.

In affirming the principle of intergovernmental

tax immunity, Chief Justice John Marshall commented in McCulloch v.
Maryland, 4 Wheat. 316, 431 (1819) that "the power to tax involves the
power to destroy." 5

If the power to create involves the power to
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preserve, the agencies of a sovereign government may not lawfully be
taxed by another.
The behavior of churches, like that of individuals, may be
effectively and predictably governed by manipulating their purse strings
through taxes and subsidies.

But there is historical evidence to

suggest that the principle of tax immunity originally applied to
American churches, as well.

Even though there was no statute expressly

providing for the exemption of church property in the District of
Columbia until 1871, church property was never assessed for taxes.
Church property enjoyed similar immunity from state taxes.

6

In recent

years, the Supreme Court has held in Walz v. Tax Commission, 397 U.S.
664, 677 (1970), that tax exemptions are a legitimate way to prevent an
"excessive entanglement" between church and state.
What complicates the picture today is the use of taxation as a
means of regulating social, political, and economic behavior.

Tax

exemptions are widely regarded as subsidies rather than immunities.
Indeed, the Supreme Court has recently adopted this view in Regan v.
Taxation With Representation, 103 S.Ct. 1997, 2000 (1983), although its
ramifications are only beginning to be spelled out.

Income taxation has

grown into a sophisticated actuarial science by which a wide range of
policy goals may be pursued through various "tax incentives."
In this connection, and perhaps due to the perennial quest for new
sources of revenue, the tax exemptions enjoyed by religious groups have
been narrowed by complex and abstruse ecclesiastical distinctions
prescribed by administrative agencies and further complicated by endless
debate and litigation.

But the basic problem is the old one of
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reconciling a variety of religious traditions and the legal requirements
of a state that lacks an official church.

According to Charles Whelan,

the "civil law structure of American churches rarely corresponds closely
with their internal ecclesiastical organization . . . . In order to
establish an identity in American civil law, most of these
ecclesiastical entities have created one or more civil law corporations
or trusts." 7

For example, there is no civil law counterpart to the

ecclesiastical unity of hierarchical churches, like the Roman Catholic
Church, or even that of congregational churches which maintain
separately incorporated ministries.

But apart from these difficulties,

the very act of classifying religious bodies for tax purposes has
created some serious anomalies that have extended into other legal
areas, such as land use, the licensure of particular ministries, and
corporate rights.
Both income and property taxation create a potentially entangling
relationship between church and state when tax exemption is treated as a
privilege rather than as an immunity.

In recent years a multitude of

stipulations--such as filing requirements for some religious
organizations and restrictions on lobbying and political activities
--have been attached to exemptions that may be every bit as inhibitory
in effect as the strings attached to outright grants.

Since tax

agencies today exercise legislative as well as executive power in the
area of administrative law, their formidable regulatory reach can easily
short-circuit the sort of restraints on official power that sustain a
republican form of government.

First Amendment privileges and

immunities are consequently at stake.

Peter Berger and Richard Neuhaus
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see a threat to church independence:
The danger today is not that churches or any one church will take
over the state. The much more real danger is that the state will
take over the functions of the church, except for the most narrowly
construed de~inition of religion limited to worship and religious
instruction.
Background
The concept of "a free church in a free state" has long been
translated in America to mean that religion is essentially private and
voluntary.

As a reaction against the inequities that plagued the

earlier religious establishments, this attitude is understandable.

But

it has also made interpretation of the historical record more difficult
and has left the boundaries between church and state in dispute.

The

dichotomization of religion into belief and practice is a logical
extension of the American voluntary church tradition.

Glenn T. Miller

has remarked:
The philosophy on which the Republic was based interpreted religion
primarily in terms of conscience. Whatever value such an
identification may have had in theory, it ignores the fact that
religion throughout its history has been more than conscience.
Religious faith almost always involves some participation ~n a
religious community that supports and sustains that faith.
The comparative neglect of this side of religious life in American
political thought after the War for Independence is important to an
understanding of the peculiar status of the church in American law.

As

Miller has noted, the legal system reflected and reinforced the dominant
congregationalism that influenced even the hierarchical traditions by
the time.

This influence may be seen in the incorporation laws that

were gradually adopted as a means of legitimizing church property and
which further contributed to the dichotomization:
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The local churches simply added the trustees to their list of
officers and restricted their powers to secular matters. The
religious questions before the congregation remained in the hands
of the appropriate body, whether the deacons, the etsers, or the
vestry. In the main, this arrangement worked well.
Miller also noted a tendency for the laws to favor doctrinal
modernization.

Courts have tended to shy away from doctrinal questions

in the event of a church split and a dispute over disposition of the
. lnvo
.
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proper t y excep t where an express t rus t lS

Before the

decision in Watson v. Jones, 13 Wall. 679 (1871 ), in which the Court
deferred to the decision of the highest authority in the church polity,
the courts had generally favored the majority faction of the
congregation.
in form.

This still held true where the church was congregational

In Bouldin v. Alexander, 15 Wall. 131 (1872), a church

property case involving two factions of a Baptist church, the Court
held: "In a congregational church, the majority, if they adhere to the
organization and to the doctrines, represent the church" (15 Wall. 131,
140).

More recently, the Court's decision in Jones v. Wolf, 443 U.S.

595 (1979), has demonstrated a new willingness to recognize the majority
of a local church, just as long as control is not clearly vested in a
hierarchy and only purely secular evidence is considered.

The concept

of an implied trust can not be extended to include questions of
faithfulness to doctrine.
Carl Zollmann, the foremost early interpreter of church property
law, treated the privatization of religion as a positive development.
He accepted the maxim that "Christianity is part of the law of the land"
but did not acknowledge the dependence of American political and legal
institutions on Christianity.

Zollmann maintained that since religious
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belief is "entirely relegated to the domain of the individual
conscience" it is legally irrelevant, so that when, for example, "the
guardianship of children comes in question the question of the religion
of the proposed guardian will not be considered."

12

The private status of religion in American law is also quite evident
in lavJs affecting the incorporation of churches.

But the nature of

corporations has changed considerably since the time of Constantine.
After the Roman Catholic Church was allowed to accept legacies in the
time of Constantine, according to Paul Kauper and Stephen Ellis, it
"recognized the usefulness of corporate status and soon adopted the idea
into the canon law."

Voluntary associations with the power to hold land

could be formed without prior consent or approval by the state.

But the

situation changed under English common law when powerful monarchs
asserted that "organizations exercising collegiate or corporate powers
could exist only with the prior approval of the monarch."
The requirement of prior approval by the state stressed the
supremacy of the state over the church, a notion that was at
variance with the church's view of itself and with traditional
medieval notions of church-state relations. The Catholic Church
saw itself as a moral person, founded in divine law, with the power
to administer its own property independently of any sovereign.
However, the Reformation, at least in England, destroyed any notion
that the church existed as a separate spiritual entity immune from
rule by the civil authorities. The use of the corporate form was
limited to organizations upon which the privilege had been
expressly bestowed. The church could no longer reside in England
as a recognized entity with the power to take and hold property.
It was now reduced to the level of any other voluntary,
uninco1§orated association, dependent upon the state's grant of
power.
The earliest religious corporations during the colonial period were
public municipal corporations.

14

As such, these church establishments

were instruments of the state and often exercised police and taxation
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powers.

Some dissenting churches were eventually granted similar

charters and became recipients of state revenue.

Finally, even church

societies that were unable to obtain corporate charters won recognition
as private corporations:
Under such circumstances the common law doctrine of prescription
was applied. A presumption was raised, from the long exercise of
corporate powers, that a charter had been granted but had been
lost. Under the theory of this fictitious lost charter the society
was.reco~gized as capable of making contracts and taking
devlces.
But changing legal circumstances made prescription too unreliable, so
that--usually following a challenge in court--the state legislatures
were compelled to formalize the legal privileges and immunities of
churches.

General incorporation acts and constitutional or statutory

tax exemptions were the common responses by the middle of the nineteenth
century.

16

Religious corporations typically took one of three forms:

the trustee corporation, the membership corporation, and the corporation
sole.

The latter was favored by the Roman Catholic Church.
In regard to the tax exemption of churches, the record of colonial

and early state practice still awaits a thorough study but a few
conclusions are generally accepted.

It has been the common practice of

the states to exempt churches from a variety of taxes since earliest
times.

But opinions were not uniformly favorable even at the beginning.

D. B. Robertson notes that James Madison was critical of a proposed
exemption for churches in Kentucky and later, as President, vetoed bills
to incorporate the Protestant Episcopal Church in Alexandria and reserve
a parcel of land in the Mississippi Territory for a Baptist church:

17

If Madison's opposition to the incorporation of churches appears to
be extreme in terms of its possible establishment of a church, it
must be understood in the context of interpretations of
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incorporation in his time. First, corporate power in the colonial
period was rarely given even to business institutions. Then, a
corporation was the state's creature, and into it the state
"breathed fictitious life." Note that a part of Madison's Veto
Message dealt with the danger of the state's entry into the inner
life of the church. Third, in the colonial establishments, the
state church, with its corporate status, had special privileges
denied to other religious societies. Fourth, corporate powers in
the colonial period had often included the power to tax; one has to
remember the explosive import of taxation in the pre-Revolutionary
colonies. Finally, it was a cause for susplclon that churches with
the capacity to hold property in their own right could, as an
"endowed church," become too powerful. These factors must be taken
into account in association with another point. We deliberately
avoided the creation in this country of ecclesiastical corporations
such as existed in England. Many states included constitutional
provisions that all organizations, when incorporated, be
18
incorporated under a general law covering all groups alike.
This "danger of the state's entry into the inner life of the
church" should not be minimized.

Under common law, a corporation is a

creature of the state, a secular entity.

In the words of Carl Zollmann,

"it is not a spiritual entity with spiritual powers to preach the gospel
and administer the sacraments, but a humble secular handmaid whose
functions are confined to the creation and enforcement of contracts and
the acquisition, management and disposition of property."
only too easily forgotten.

19

This is

The incorporation of a religious society

places the title to church property into the hands of the trustees and
subjects the corporate body to all the obligations of a secular
association, including taxation in the form of a filing fee.

The

intricate web of finance and regulation now entangling the church gives
substance to Madison's doubts.
If these early experiments in religious liberty showed signs of
uncertainty and ambivalence, this may be readily explained by the
freshness of the sectarian animosities that had been generated by and
eventually brought down the religious establishments.

Even so, churches
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continued to be well protected under common law and were regarded as
centers of community life.

In the Terrett decision and similar cases

which followed, such as Society for the Propagation of the Gospel v. New
Haven, 8 Wheat. 464 (1823), and Mason v. Muncaster, 9 Wheat. 445 (1824),
the Supreme Court upheld the property succession rights of formerly
established churches.
Private property in general was constitutionally protected against
unwarranted searches and seizures, thus enjoying a sanctity once
reserved to recognized churches.

Public taxation and expenditure were

expected to spread the costs and benefits of public services equitably
and not be used for private gain.

20

Police powers--including the

regulation of property with respect to fire prevention, public highways,
sanitation, and zoning--were held to be delegated by the local citizenry
to their town and county officers, reflecting a tradition of local
.

sel f -government that reached back to feuda 1 tlmes.

21

Yet churches were

not only exempted from taxes but were also recipients of a variety of
social benefits without being subjected to obtrusive social regulation.
Although their immunities may have been largely customary, it is
unlikely that the early legislatures ever foresaw a day when police
regulations might be used to exclude churches from some neighborhoods in
advance, be kept from improving their facilities by restrictive zoning
laws, or even be forbidden to hold prayer meetings in private homes
without a permit.

22

This growing emphasis on external regulation--as

opposed to internalized moral control--supports the thesis that American
society has been in the midst of a transition between an inner-directed
culture to an other-directed one.

23

But this change is by no means
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completely assured.
Early American law made a distinction

bet~;veen

the church itself and

the religious society that held church property in trust.

Zollmann

explored the legal implications of this distinction:
An unincorporated church, so-called, if it has any interest in
property at all, presents a two-fold aspect. It has a body, that
society, with which courts can deal, and a soul, the church, with
which courts cannot deal . . . . The church is subject to spiritual
censure, the society is subject to the temporal powers that be.
The object of the church is the preaching of ~lle gospel, the object
of the society is the management of property.
He thus removed the problem of temporal control over the church by
defining atvay its possibility.

But this makes the church virtually

nonexistent as far as the law is concerned.

Such a definition is

susceptible to the charge--often lodged against excessive piety--that
"it is so heavenly minded it is no earthly good."

Zollmann apparently

failed to recognize the importance of upholding tax exemptions as an
immunity from interference with religious free exercise rather than
simply as an admirable custom:
This exemption is not so easily justified on principle as it is
supported by authority. It is in fact easier to admire the motive
which prompted it than to justify it by any sound reasoning. While
charity and education may be said to be established in the policy
of the state, an establishment of religion is expressly prohibited
both in the federal constitution and in most if not all the state
constitutions. The strictly religious features of church societies
can therefore furnish no valid reason for this exemption. The only
rational ground remaining on which it can be justified is the
benefit accruing to the state thro~§h the influence exerted by
various churches on their members.
The view of Carl Zollmann that church tax exemptions were awarded
as a mere afterthought, and that they are justifiable only on the basis
of some presumed public benefit, has been an influential one.
Pfeffer articulated it from a separationist rationale:

Lee
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Objective consideration of the oplnlons in the Everson and McCollum
cases leads to the conclusion that tax exemption for churches
violates the First Amendment as interpreted by these
decisions . . . . Under these decisions, government aid to religion,
even if not preferential or discriminatory, is barred by the
Constitution, and few would geny that exemption of church property
2
constitutes government aid.
Robert Drinan similarly reiterated this position from an
accomrnodationist perspective:
No entirely satisfactory rationale for tax exemption has ever been
stated in any American judicial decision. It may be that the only
possible ultimate justification is a public policy consciously
encouraging religion as a valuable aid to good citizenship. Courts
and commentators quite understandably are reluctant to reach such
ultimates and, if they must give a plausible reason for tax
immunity for religious bodies, tend to urge one of the three
following justifications:
1. Tax exemption for churches and related institutions has
always existed in American law; in fact, it can be traced back to
Constantine or even to the Talmud, according to which rabbis wsre
given certain tax exemptions.
2. Churches by means of the educational programs which they
sponsor participate in the work of the state and thereby relieve it
of some of its burdens.
3. No Court decision in American jurisprudence has ever ruled
that tax exem~fion to religious groups is a discrimination against
nonbelievers.
There is no historical evidence to conclude that the tax immunity
of churches was regarded as a subsidy.

Any exemption, credit, or

deduction could be viewed in the same manner.

While the benefits of tax

immunity are quite evident, the public and governmental nature of the
church should not be overlooked.

This lies at the heart of the matter.

Zollmann argued that churches were originally exempted because they were
public agencies and were the public property.

28

This is true only in a

very qualified sense because they were neither the property of the
parish nor the property of the state.

Prior to the Dedham case, only

covenanted church members participated in determining church policy in
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Massachusetts.
While the character of churches as taxing authorities helps account
for their traditional exemption, a different explanation must account
for the continuation of the exemption after disestablishment.

But, in

fact, the practice of exempting churches was not so unconscious as the
belated statutory recognition of it might seem to indicate.

The wording

of a New York statute of 1801 suggests that churches, which had been
disestablished in 1777, were still regarded as public rather than
private entities.

The statute provided:

That no houses or lands belonging to the United States or to the
people of this state, nor any church or place of public worship,
nor any personal property belonging to any minister or priest not
exceeding in value of one thousand five hundred dollars, nor any
college or incorporated academy, nor any schoolhouse, courthouse,
goal [sic], alms house, or property belonging to 2~Y incorporated
library, shall be taxed by any law of this state.
A similar understanding of the public nature of church ministries may be
found in City of Hannibal v. Draper, 15 Mo. 634 (1852), which upheld tax
immunity:
It is presumed that in the nineteenth century, in a Christian land,
no argument is necessary to show that church purposes are public
purposes . . . . To deny that church purposes are public purposes is
to argue that the maintenance, support, and propagation of the
Christian religion is not a matter of public concern. Our laws,
although they recognize no particular religious establishment, are
not insensible to the advantages of Christianity, and extend their
protection to all in that faith and mode of worship they may choose
to adopt.
If the tax exemption of churches is to be regarded as a relic of
the era of state religion, it would appear to be an expensive and often
inconvenient relic.

But the church was not under the patronage of the

sovereign, as in England, where it was one of the estates of the realm.
The encouragement of religion was not equated with an establishment of
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religion in the narrow sense of an established church.

The kind of

separation of church and state the founders sought would not have
permitted this.
The exemption of churches from taxes only became a salient
political issue long after independence, particularly during two periods
of social and economic upheaval in the nineteenth century.

The first

period coincided with the era of Jacksonian Democracy, the Workingmen's
Party in New York, and the early reform movement fostered by various
benevolent societies.

It was also a time of nativist agitation,

30
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Robertson quoted one expression of this sentiment:
One obvious form of privilege to be destroyed as "the exemption
from taxation of churches, church property, and the property of
priests under fifteen hundred dollars, for it yas nothing short of
3
a direct and positive robbery of the people."
The second period coincided with the Civil War and Reconstruction, the
sundering of three major denominations, and the controversy over a
proposed Christian Amendment and, later, the Blaine Amendment.

Churches

divided over the Grant Administration's appeal for the establishment of
a national public school system coupled with the taxation of church
property.

Since support tended to be mild and opposition was intense,

the proposed amendment failed.

32

Although lobbying against the tax

immunity of churches flared from time to time afterwards, one
commentator concluded by 1949 that "the tax-exemption battle of the
churches seems to have been won by exhaustion."

33

Dean Kelley's characterization of this immunity as "a condition
almost of 'extraterritoriality'"

34

is a singularly appropriate one, both

in light of historical courtesy and with reference to the vulnerability
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of foreign enclaves and diplomatic missions.

Like the rest of society,

churches have been similarly affected by changing legal, economic, and
political conditions at home and abroad.
But the traditional accommodation may be most threatened by a shift
in the major policymaking arena from the legislatures to the courts and
now to the administrative agencies: which is to say, from fairly visible
to very invisible organs of civil government.

Numerous pieces of social

legislation--often worded in general terms--have spawned a variety of
sometimes competing administrative programs and bureaus that seek to
define, often as broadly as possible, the scope of their delegated
authority.

With reference to the role played by the Internal Revenue

Service (IRS) in applying charitable benefit criteria in determining tax
exemptions, Justice Powell argued in Bob Jones University v. United
States, 103 S.Ct. 2017, 2039 (1983): "It is not appropriate to leave the
IRS 'on the cutting edge of developing national policy' . . . . The
contours of public policy should be determined by Congress, not by
judges or the IRS."

Indeed, compared with the incremental revision of

traditional accommodations amidst the tangle of administrative law
created by federal agencies, the limited lobbying and legal successes of
Americans United for Separation of Church and State, New York's
Committee for Public Education and Religious Liberty, the American Civil
Liberties Union, and other separationist organizations seem fairly
pallict. 35

Ironically, Americans United lost its status as a tax-exempt

educational organization in Alexander v. "Americans United" Inc., 416
U.S. 752 (1974), as a result of its own extensive lobbying on religious
issues.
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Income Taxation
Edwin R. A. Seligman, an early American proponent of progressive
income taxation, maintained that the income tax per se evolved only
gradually out of earlier faculty taxes: poll taxes, property taxes, and
consumption taxes.

By the 1840s, it had been introduced in a fairly

mature form in Pennsylvania, Maryland, Virginia, and other states. 36
Although the income tax was suggested as a source of federal revenue
following the War of 1812, it was not adopted until 1862 by the Union
and 1863 by the Confederacy as a war measure.

The Socialist and

Populist parties promoted the idea through their platforms but the
income tax lapsed following the war.

It was revived by Congress in 1894

but the Supreme Court ruled it unconstitutional a year later. 37

Passage

of the Sixteenth Amendment in 1913 enabled Congress to add income tax
provisions to a tariff act later that year.

38

At first, the personal income tax was not a major source of federal
revenue and served instead more as a supplement to tariffs and excises.
Even in 1938, as Henry G. Simon noted, it contributed less than ten
percent of all revenues. 39

Today, personal income taxes represent

nearly half of net federal receipts.
The utility of the income tax as a source of revenue is perhaps
exceeded only by its potential as a means of information-gathering and
regulation.

Although exemptions were recognized from the beginning, a

lobbying limitation on exempt organizations was added in 1934, followed
twenty years later by provisions against influencing legislation or
"intervening" in political campaigns.

In the meantime, the Treasury

Department itself introduced a regulation denying deductibility to

446
contributions to "associations formed to disseminate controversial or
partisan propaganda."

40

This helped establish a pattern of bureaucratic

initiative, followed later by congressional authorization or judicial
permission after the fact.
The Internal Revenue Service (IRS) has been given a series of
congressional authorizations since 1939 to establish an elaborate
monitoring system for tax-exempt organizations.

Sharon Worthing has

described the system as follows: "The system has five basic components:
the information return, the notice requirements for entitlement to
treatment as an exempt organization, the Exempt Organization Master
File, various types of IRS audits, and IRS cooperation with state
attorneys general."

41

She believes that an inordinate amount of

attention is directed at a "particular category of organizations which
includes churches and their officers" and observes that while "there is
a reasonable limit on information obtained for the purpose of collecting
taxes . . . there is no limit on the information which may be sought
when the motive is one of surveillance only."

42

She believes that, due

to "the ease with which tax laws can be used to control an
organization's functions even without loss of exempt status," the
requirement that some church-related organizations file information
returns "can be seen as a first step whose ultimate end is full
government surveillance of religious institutions.n

43

Even though churches are included within the mandatory exceptions
from the filing requirement, church-related ministries are less secure
unless they are readily identifiable as "integrated auxiliaries."

This

term had been interpreted by IRS to mean church-affiliated organizations
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whose "principal activity is exclusively religious.''

Despite the

vagueness of the original congressional wording, IRS has determined
''integrated auxiliaries'' to include seminaries, youth groups, and adult
fellowships, but to exclude hospitals, homes for the elderly,
orphanages, and grade schools.

44

But apart from difficulties created by differing conceptions of
what activities are properly called church ministries, even bona fide
churches are having their exemptions challenged by IRS.

Pastor Dale

Dykema of the Church of Christian Liberty in Brookfield, Wisconsin, has
been ordered by a federal circuit court to turn over fourteen categories
of church records subpoenaed so that IRS could make a determination on
its tax-exempt status.

The church, which follows the Westminster

Confession, has not been accused of violating the law or operating an
unrelated business.

To date, it has refused to comply with the order.

This is not an isolated case.

45

A Mennonite church has been denied tax

exemption because it maintains a medical aid plan for its members.
Other churches have been sent demands for church records.

46

The rationale for church tax exemptions is also a matter of dispute
in the current literature.

Two major theories of income tax exemption

have been competing for support in recent years.

The first of these,

known as the tax expenditure theory, treats tax exemption as "an
affirmative benefit extended by legislative grace to those organizations
that benefit the public (and withdrawable at will from those the
legislature deems no longer deserving of its favor)."

47

From this

viewpoint, exemptions are regarded as "revenues foregone by the
government as though granted to the exempt entity in fulfillment of
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legislative purposes . . .
When viewed in this light, church exemptions would fail the secular
purpose and neutral effect portions of the tripartite test.

As for the

entanglement test, the tax expenditure theory might even tip the scales
against exempting churches because from the viewpoint of political
expediency, if for no other reason, it would be difficult to reject a
strict accounting from the recipients.
much in the Lemon case.

The Chief Justice indicated as

All such information would be necessarily a

matter of public record, greatly increasing the risks of political and
economic coercion--either by the state or by private groups--against
churches.
Rules against political activity, lobbying, unrelated business
income, and various types of religion-based discrimination may have a
similar chilling effect.

Churches are not more inclined than anyone

else to bite the hand that feeds them.

The monitoring of religious

organizations by IRS even now tends to produce "the kind of continuing
day-to-day relationship" which the Court tried to obviate in its Walz
decision.

Although Chief Justice Warren Burger rejected the "social

welfare yardstick" as a rationale for church exemptions because of its
quid pro quo implications, he weakened his overall case for exemptions
by arguing that they necessarily involved some degree of entanglement.
The other current theory of tax exemption is known as the tax base
theory.

Its statement by Boris Bittker is considered definitive:

A close examination of the nature of tax exemptions reveals a
serious weakness in the contention that exemptions automatically
serve to establish religion. There is no way to tax everything; a
legislative body, no matter how avid for revenue, can do no more
than pick out from the universe of people, entities, and events
over which it has jurisdiction those that, in its view, are
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appropriate objects of taxation. In specifying the ambit of any
tax, the legislature cannot avoid "exempting" those persons,
events, activitie~~ or entities that are outside the territory of
the proposed tax.
Bittker's argument from technical impracticality weakens his case.
Recent advances in communications technology suggest that the taxable
"universe" may be expanded or restructured indefinitely.

The tax base

theory also fails to address the issue of whether it is within the
jurisdiction of the state to tax the church.

Bittker appears to assume

that legislative bodies possess inherent power to seek revenue from any
available source.

This might include churches.

The tax base theory treats churches in the same way as nonprofit
organizations in general.

This can create difficulties if authorities

try to draw the logical conclusion that churches are also public trusts.
Establishment clause issues would be unavoidable.

The defensibility of

tax exemptions for churches must rest on some other basis.
Separationists argue that such exemptions effectively give churches
favored status and, in addition, give public officials some leverage
over the conduct of church affairs.

If exemptions are indeed treated as

subsidies, it is difficult to escape the conclusion reached by Justice
Jackson about the effects of such aid in his Everson dissent:
If the state may aid these religious schools, it may therefore
regulate them. Many groups have sought aid from tax funds only to
find that it carried political controls with it. Indeed this Court
has declared that 'It is hardly lack of due process for the
Governm~mt to regulate that Hhich it subsidizes' ( 330 U.S. 1 ,
27-28).

Given the state's technical ability to oversee and regulate church
activities, further constitutional precautions against such an
eventuality would need to be taken, particularly if the taxation of
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churches were favored under a new interpretation of the establishment
clause favored the taxation of churches.

As a practical matter, the tax

exemption of churches could be sustained under the tax expenditure
theory only if churches as churches are regarded as immune from the
jurisdiction of the state in this respect.
a tax immunity.

But the issue is larger than

If the state were to assert jurisdiction over every

activity that takes place within its territorial boundaries, it would
effectively claim whatever authority the church possesses as its own.
If the state were to limit its direct interest in certain activities,
such as the exercise of religion, simply as a matter of expediency, then
what seems inexpedient at one point may become expedient under different
circumstances.

Only by recognizing that the jurisdiction of the state

is inherently limited and that churches are protected from interference
can the inevitable involvement of the church with the state and the
state with the church be addressed in a manner that respects the
authority of the church as a self-governing entity.
Adequate constitutional protections already exist.

But

constitutional practice tends to follow suit when constitutional theory
changes.

Th~s

far, the operations of comparatively few churches have

been called into question for failure to comply with rules established
for tax-exempt organizations.

In the absence of income tax filing

requirements for churches, most churches have had little or no direct
contact with IRS until recently.
But as a result of recent changes in the Social Security Act, which
took effect on January 1, 1984, churches are now required to pay
withholding taxes for nonministerial staff employees.

It is widely
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believed to be the first instance of a direct tax being imposed on
churches.

Ordained ministers are still able to apply for and receive

self-employment exemptions.
Particular concern has been expressed that this precedent may have
a snowball effect if it is allowed to stand.

Many Fundamentalist

churches--perhaps numbering a few thousand--have already refused to file
the required tax forms.

At the same time, many of these churches have

dissolved their corporations in order to free themselves from an
entangling relationship with the state and possibly escape liability for
the tax.
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Court challenges can be anticipated if an attempt to amend or delay
the law fails in Congress.

But a ruling favorable to the churches may

be considered unlikely in view of the Court's decision in United States
v. Lee, 102 S.Ct. 1051 (1982), unanimously reversing a lower court
ruling that an Amish employer is exempted from having to pay social
security taxes for his Amish employees.

The Court narrowly construed a

statutory exemption accommodating self-employed Amish and self-employed
members of other religious groups who objected to the taxes.

Chief

Justice Burger wrote that "mandatory participation is indispensable to
the fiscal vitality of the social security system.

Most revealing of

all, however, was his treatment of religious exemptions:
The difficulty in attempting to accommodate religious beliefs in
the area of taxation is that 'we are a cosmopolitan nation made up
of people of almost every conceivable religious preference.'
Braunfeld, 366 U.S. at 606, 81 S.Ct. at 1147. The Court has long
recognized that balance must be struck between the values of the
comprehensive social system, which rests on a co~plex of actuarial
factors, and the consequences of allowing religiously based
exemptions. To maintain an organized society that guarantees
religious freedom to a great variety of faiths requires that some
religious practices yield to the common good. Religious beliefs
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can be accommodated . . . but there is a point at which
accommodation would "radically restrict the operating latitude of
the legislature." Braunfeld, supra at 606, 81 S.Ct. at 1147.
Unlike the situation presented in Wisconsin v. Yoder, . . . it
would be difficult to accommodate the comprehensive social security
system with myriad exceptions flowing from a wide variety of
religious beliefs. The obligation to pay the social security tax
initially is not fundamentally different from the obligation to pay
income taxes; the difference--in theory at least--is that the
social security tax revenues are segregated for use only in
furtherance of the statutory program. There is no principled way,
howEver, for purposes of this case, to distinguish between general
taxes and those imposed under the Social Security Act. If, for
example, a religious adherent believes war is a sin, and if a
certain percentage of the federal budget can be identified as
devoted to war-related activities, such individuals would have a
similarly valid claim to be exempt from paying that percentage of
the income tax. The tax system could not function if denominations
were allowed to challenge the tax system because tax payments were
spent in a manner that violates their religious belief (102 S.Ct.
1051' 1056).
By implication, the Court here treats tax exemption on religious
grounds as an act of grace by the sovereign, as many lower courts have
done in the past.

The decision also makes evident some of the

disadvantages for churches of the broadened definition of religion.

The

accommodation of religious belief, as exemplified by the Sherbert,
Yoder, and Thomas rulings, is now described in purely discretionary
terms.

It is no longer simply a matter of restricting religious conduct

which diverges from commonly accepted moral standards.

Religious

liberty is now effectively limited by considerations about the
consequences of generally available exceptions.

Its independent

constitutional value is also reduced, which has a tendency to narrow the
boundaries of religious liberty.

The competing claims of a wide variety

of religious beliefs may consequently make the recognition of
religion-based exceptions more difficult to justify or sustain.
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Property Taxation
Although the intricacies of the income tax system may pose the
greatest potential hazard for fiscal entanglements between church and
state, this potential is likely to remain latent as long as churches
enjoy generally favorable public opinion.

The fiscal crises of major

American cities, which wax and wane with greater intensity than ever,
may pose a greater immediate challenge as local governments seek new
sources of revenue.

One idea that is already gaining strong support is

the restriction of property tax exemptions to the sanctuary of the
church, the classroom building of the school, and the land immediately
beneath.
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Assuming such a plan to be practicable and equitable, it

leaves unanswered an important question: What happens when new sources
of revenue are required?
Church property tax exemptions, which are well established in
historical precedent, are similarly regarded as subsidies by many
critics.

According to Arvo Van Alstyne: "One of the most pervasive and

firmly stablished anomalies in American law is the permissibility of
subsidization of religious institutions through tax exemption in a legal
order constitutionally committed to separation of church and state."
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This assumes that the practice is not only inconsistent with general tax
policy, as it well may be, but that it also violates the constitutional
commitment to separation of church and state.
debatable.

The last point is

But Van Alstyne recognized the inherent problem with a

vaguely worded exemption, which, as he noted, "constitutes a veritable
invitation to aggressive and conscientious tax officers to resolve any
doubts against exemptions."
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Vagueness of exemption language, coupled with the institutional
dynamics of the assessor's position, tends, by inviting litigation,
to impose a practical tax discrimination upon those churches which
are most in need of financial assistance and least able to afford
the costs, financial and otherwise, of such litigation. 5
This observation holds just as true today as it did when it was written
in the 1950s.

It is part of the danger of the entanglement problem that

its effects are generally hidden from public view.
But the hazards of overzealous law enforcement are only part of the
story.

Legislative vagueness invites creative interpretations by the

revenue agencies themselves.

An atmosphere of general uncertainty tends

to dampen enthusiasm and innovation.

Van Alstyne attributed a

"particularly vicious impact'' to what he calls legislative buck-passing,
then added:
Another feature of the church exemption pattern, with respect to
which little has been said, relates to the influence which tax
exemptions may exert in motivating or perhaps even controlling
decisions of church policy. The array of special conditions which
statutes frequently impose upon the availability of exemption may
impose realistic barriers to freedom of action. For example,
statutory emphasis upon "use'' for exempt purposes, although perhaps
without any conscious legislative intent to reach that result, has
frequently resulted in denial of exemption to church buildings
under construction. Paradoxically, such denial normally occurs at
the very time when the fundamentaS considerations justifying tax
exemption are at their strongest. 5
As long as tax exemptions are considered subsidies, they are
difficult to square with current separationist doctrine.

Financial need

and social utility are unlikely to be accepted as arguments in favor of
continuing them.

The major difficulty with the tax expenditure theory

from the standpoint of churches is the possibility that conditions would
be attached to tax exemptions.
These problems may be inherent in the nature of the general
property tax and, particularly, in the dependence of local taxing
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districts on property taxes as a source of revenue.

The dwindling urban

tax base--coupled with the deterioration of its existing capital, the
growing expense of maintenance, the geographical containment of its
taxing authority, and the anachronization of its economic
infrastructure--is both the cause and the effect of the flight to the
suburbs, urban sprawl, and general social dislocation. 56

Property

taxes, particularly as they are normally assessed, tend to work against
improvements.

Zoning regulations are sought to help protect property

values, but the segregation of property according to use and population
characteristics may have the effect of further aggravating these
conditions. 57

In this light, the church may be seen as one of many

drains on the tax base, one of many anomalies in land use plans, and one
of many possible supplicants for relief.
Cases and Controversies
The entanglement problems associated with property taxes and the
use of church property generally arise in conjunction with other
regulations relating to schools, zoning, income taxes, or corporate
privileges.

Trouble in one area may spell trouble in others.

Internal

church disputes, neighborhood complaints, political controversies, and
law enforement policies are among the usual catalysts.
A property tax dispute that involved over sixty churches in
California is illustrative of the interrelatedness of the factors that
may create entanglement problems.

Before the controversy was resolved

through special legislation signed by the governor on June 22, 1983,
several churches had lost all corporate privileges, including use of
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their name and their right to representation in court.

At least

thirty-five churches of these churches faced public auction for back
taxes.
The dispute originated over several related issues.

Attorney

General George Deukmejian, who became the Governor of California in
1983, issued an opinion in 1979 that made the following points.

First,

he maintained that churches and their schools may be classified
separately.

For tax purposes, churches were then being required to file

annual "Church Exemption" forms.

This exemption was applicable only to

property "used exclusively for religious worship."
required to file "Welfare Exemption" forms.

Schools were

Second, he concluded that

churches are liable for the payment of taxes just as long as a
particular tax or fee is not exacted for the privilege of exercising
their religion.

Third, he characterized the tax exmption of churches as

''a bounty or gratuity on the part of the sovereign and when once granted
may be withdrawn."
trusts.

Finally, he held that churches are charitable public

By definition, this means that churches hold property in trust

for the state.
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The immediate catalyst of the dispute was the insertion of a clause
in the Franchise Tax Board's Form 199B for 1978.
a.

It simply read:

If exempt under Section 23701D and you have during the year
(1) attempted to influence legislation or any ballot measure,
or (2) participated in any political campaign, or (3) made an
election under Section 23704.5 (relating to lobbying by public
charities), complete and attach Form FTB 3509 (available from
your local Franchise Tax Board Office). (See Instruction f.) 59

Below this new section was a note concerning failure to file:

"The

corporate rights, powers and privileges may be suspended, or the
exemption from tax may be revoked for failure to file an information
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statement."

Instruction f defined "influencing legislation" as

including advocating "the adoption or rejection of legislation."
These instructions posed a dilemma for many pastors who had made
statements from the pulpit on sensitive political issues.

Rev. Roy

Morawski of Fundamental Baptist Church in Santa Maria even sent an
inquiry to the Franchise Tax Board early in 1980 stating that
periodically he spoke against abortion and homosexuality from the pulpit
and had recently encouraged church members to vote against a statewide
initiative concerning homosexual rights.

A tax auditor replied: "The

political activity disclosed in your letter of February 5, 1980, is
considered influencing legislation and you will be required to file form
FTB 3509 with this office."

6

°

would be assessed for taxes.

Filing the form meant that the church
Failure to file meant the loss of

corporate privileges for incorporated churches.

Filing Form 199B

without acknowledging political activities would have had the same
result.
Several churches chose not to file and formed an organization to
work toward changing these rules.

In fact, the 1980 Form 199B

~rapped

the stipulation relating to influencing legislation but added a note to
an otherwise inapplicable section of the instructions: "Public charities
(but not churches) are allowed to carry on propaganda or otherwise
influence legislation on a limited basis if they make the election
provided by Section 23704.5."
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California's public trust doctrine first became a political issue
when the attorney general's office cited it to justify its intervention
in a dispute involving the Worldwide Church of God.

On January 3, 1979,
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a court-appointed receiver arrived without notice at headquarters in
Pasadena and had public officials remove dozens of cartons of church
records on the basis of an ex parte court order obtained hours earlier
by the attorney general.
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Months later, the state legislature

formalized the attorney general's power through a revision of the
Nonprofit Religious Corporation Law.

Almost immediately, a movement was

begun by religious and political leaders to repeal this revision.

State

Sen. Nicholas Petris, a Democrat from Oakland, introduced legislation in
1980, SB 1493, to repeal the new law.

A major political battle took

shape involving state legislators, civil liberties organizations, the
press, and religious organization.

Governor Edmund G. Brown, Jr., threw

his support behind the bill and, after it passed, signed it into law at
the end of September.

Almost immediately, Attorney General George

Deukmejian dropped legal action against the Worldwide Church of God,
Synanon, and other religious groups accused of misusing tax-exempt
income, claiming that effective date of the new law allowed him
insufficient time to conclude the cases.
election year controversy.

This became a source of
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Meanwhile, more than sixty churches were attempting to sue the
state over their lost exemptions.

They were warned that they must pay

back taxes or forfeit their property.

Some of them received notices

that their corporate rights were suspended.

Blocked from seeking

relief in the courts because they were stripped of their corporate
identity, the churches sought a legislative solution.

State Senator H.

L. Richardson introduced a bill that that created an alternative
"Religious Exemption" which simply required a one-time filing notice.

A
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week before Pastor Hans Nikoley's Pomerado Road Baptist Church of Poway
was scheduled to be sold, Governor Deukmejian signed a bill cancelling
the churches' liability for back taxes.
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Subsidies
Even a brief survey of the numerous tax-related problems faced by
churches suggests that a considerable degree of entanglement may be
inherent in the very structure of the existing tax system.

Although

exemptions offer some limited protection against direct involvement with
the government, they may eventuate in further entanglements if
exemptions are made conditional.

Furthermore, these problems would be

unlikely to vanish if churches were taxed.

Whether formally

incorporated or not, churches operate within the context of a highly
visible secular state that dominates all their horizons.

The earlier

institutional pluralism that allowed churches a considerable degree of
independence from daily involvement with the state and its programs has
given way to a growing institutional centralization within a highly
integrated economic system.
The entanglement hazards inherent in the tax system may also be
inherent in the plethora of grant programs funded by the federal and
state governments.

Whether or not churches become formal recipients of

aid, they may become unavoidably entangled in the conditions attached to
such aid or be affected by an increasing scarcity of funding
alternatives.

Moreover, current patterns of giving tithes and offerings

in the churches are substantially affected by the high level of public
taxation and expenditure as well as by tax deductibility.
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The fiscal relationship between church and state that has grown
over the years is so comprehensive that the change of one factor, like
the abolition of deductibility for church contributions, would have an
enormous impact on church operations.
holdings could be expected as a result.

A reduction of church property
The trend toward home churches

and home Bible studies might be reinforced.
take place in a vacuum.

But new developments never

Special precautions would still be required in

order to safeguard religious liberty.

Restrictive zoning regulations,

stipulations on the use of public property, and other factors must be
taken into account.
The same motives that led originally to religious establishments
may be at work in efforts to subsidize religious organizations.
Churches were often entrusted with the responsibility of defending the
moral and ideological standards of the community and reproducing the
culture through education.

The disestablishment of churches did nothing

to change the demand for an institutionalized bulwark.

It appears that

churches continue to fill this

Some financial

function unofficially.

ties with the state linger, although on an incidental basis.
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Bradfield v. Roberts, 175 U.S. 291 (1899), was an early example of
involvement by the federal judiciary in questions about aid to religion.
If for no other reason, the Court's decision is significant for
asserting the principle that religious bodies may form and operate

.
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secu 1 ar corpora t lOns.

Corporations are by definition creatures of the

state, a fact that holds great significance for incorporated churches.
While incidents such as the placement of the Worldwide Church of God
into receivership and the loss of corporate privileges by a number of
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California churches may be rare, they point up some of the political
realities that currently define the relationship between church and
state.
Systematic federal aid was initiated--if tax exemptions are
excepted--after the Second World War with passage of the Hill-Burton
Act, which provided federal funds to assist the expansion of public and
non-profit hospitals, which included denominational hospitals.

Leo

Pfeffer notes that opposition to such aid was less pronounced within
Protestant and Jewish circles than it was toward aid to parochial
schools.
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Later, during the Kennedy Administration, the Peace Corps

program fostered alliances between public and private agencies, half of
.
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. h were re 1.lglous.
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The year 1964, however, proved to be a watershed in the growing
cooperation between church and state in the promotion of
federally-funded programs.

It was the year the Johnson Administration

succeeded in pushing a comprehensive package of programs through
Congress as part of its recently declared War on Poverty.

Numerous new

agencies, particularly the Office of Economic Opportunity (OEO) and
Volunteers in Service to America (VISTA), were created to reach directly
into local communities.

Churches were mobilized in part of the effort.

Observers were awed by the speed with which a national political
consensus was reached and the direct cooperation of churches was
enlisted.

In many respects, the new mood resembled a religious revival

and the President played the role of a Jonathan Edwards or a Charles
Finney in orchestrating it.
element in the equation.

But emotional fervor was not the only

As Lyle Schaller noted not long afterward,
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another factor was the willingness of the federal government "to share
the resources in its arsenal with its allies.

There was money to be

allocated, patronage to be dispensed, and dreams to be fulfilled.

Many

of the new allies quickly saw that here was an opportunity that would
enable them to enlarge their own programs, accelerate their rate of
progress, and strengthen their own institutional position."
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Some

churches shared in the resultant windfall but all churches were affected
by the new political reality.

Even as new interfaith alliances were

forged, new frictions also developed as churches variously welcomed or
resisted this warm political embrace.

New centers of power emerged in

local communities at a time when the political power structures in many
states were being redefined through court-mandated reapportionment.
The availability of grants-in-aid for sundry purposes--construction
loans, student grants, aid to conduct poverty programs--brought the
relationship of church and state to a new level of public awareness and
political entanglement.

It was the use of churches as channels of

public programs and public money that evoked the greatest doubts.
Subsidies that began as channels for promoting the general welfare
became conduits also of government regulation.
David Kucharsky observed in 1967 that six billion dollars a year in
government subsidies was available to churches and other religious
institutions.

A variety of educational and social programs had been

served this way since the Housing Act of 1950.

The National Defense

Education Act of 1958, the Higher Education Facilities Act of 1963, the
Higher Education Act of 1965, and the Elementary and Secondary Education
Act of 1965 were among the new instruments through which federal funds
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were channeled into religious organizations.
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These subsidies inspired
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Indirect aid has also contributed to a tightening of controls.
Surplus land sales, unrelated business income, lease backs, feeder
corporations, and special low postage rates were among the loopholes and
forms of assistance that separationists protested.

Arthur Herzog

summarized the state of affairs that existed in 1968:
Sensibility for the feelings of organized religion seems to have
dictated that "private" or "non-public" be used in government
policy descriptions, but nonetheless, as of 1965, there were 115
federal programs in which churches could participate. The Treasury
gives confiscated wines and liquors to churches; the Office of
Economic Opportunity's Project Headstart uses church buildings and
pays for upkeep; under the recreation or urban renewal programs the
churches can buy land with cheap loans; the National Institutes of
Health awarded a large grant to Western Reserve University in
Cleveland for internships for clergymen in urban ministries; even
the Department of Agriculture was conducting a seminar called "The
Christian Farmer and His Country" while rural churches were asked
to observe "Soil Stewardship Week." "It is doubtful," writes Dr.
LaNoue, "that there is a legislature in the land so tongue-tied
that it could not find a multitude of secular ~urposes to cover any
religious interest it wished to accommodate." 7
Where these practices have not been abolished, they have been
subjected to stricter regulations.

Many persist, such as the disposal

of surplus property at little or not cost to religious institutions.
The Supreme Court upheld this practice on a five to four vote in in
Valley Forge Christian College v. Americans United, 454 U.S. 464 (1982)
when it held that Americans United lacked standing to sue.
To date, complaints about entanglements have generally come from
religious colleges.

Hillsdale College in Michigan and Grove City

College in Pennsylvania have both declined to participate in federal
subsidy programs but have nevertheless been confronted with intrusive
federal requirements because some of their students received federal
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But another possible area of entanglement was opened up

by the Court's ruling in Mueller v. Allen, 103 S.Ct. 3062 (1983), when
it upheld a Minnesota tuition tax credit program.

This decision may

further encourage congressional efforts to provide tuition tax relief at
a national level.
Conclusions
While the fear that the church may become too powerful is
historically understandable, the present reality is that the
jurisdictional authority of the church has been severely circumscribed.
It commands no troops and controls no territory.

Its primary defense is

the power of public opinion, which is changeable.
Part of the conflict over fiscal regulation of churches is clearly
economic in motivation.

Many churches pursue investment options,

operate profitable business activities, acquire real estate holdings,
accept large bequests, and receive tax breaks for parsonages,
cemeteries, and other property not directly connected with the church
sanctuary or exclusively used for worship.

As with the mortmain laws of

an earlier time, some states and municipalities restrict such
acquisitions or refuse to exempt them from taxation.

This may lead to

difficulties for churches that must pay taxes until they complete their
church building on newly acquired property.
The fiscal crises of government at all levels is a primary
motivating factor.

Although the fiscal and monetary policies of the

state may be faulted for creating the serious budgetary problems that
have provoked some of these conflicts, the demand for solutions is not

465
any the less pressing.

D. B. Robertson, who is critical of many

exemptions enjoyed by churches, has clearly delineated the points of
conflict:
The increasing size of the public debt is a symptom of the presure
upon, or within, the Federal Government for ever higher revenues.
But even thoough increasing amounts of federal money are being
"shared" with states and local governments, pressures continue to
build on these levels for for more tax money. At the 1966 meeting
of representatives of state legislatures, the following
recommendation was offered as one requisite for improving the
effectiveness of state legislatures: "Constitutional limits on the
taxing power, constitutional ear-marking of funds, constitutional
requirements that bond issues be submitted to popular vote, and
other limitations on the legislature's power to appropriate public
funds, and t9 address itself to public questions, should be
4
eliminated."
It is an ironic testament to the deeprooted nature of the fiscal problem
of the modern state that 1966 was at the peak of the postwar economic
boom.

The tendency toward compromise is endemic to contemporary

politics, particularly when two or more competing goods are at stake.
But Robertson noted the danger here:
A spokesman for the citizens of New York State warned the delegates
to the 1967 Constitutional Convention against removing the
constitutional restraints that limit the real esate [sic] taxing
powers of municipalities . . If these restraints are removed, he
said, "the taxpayers will be at the mercy of local governmen75 that
instinctively turn to real estate to solve fiscal problems."
A major source of the problem with regard to taxes and exemptions,
then, is not logic but ambition.

Ambition is what prompts people to

reach beyond the ambit of their authority, as James Madison understood
when he proposed in Federalist No. 51: "Ambition must be made to counter
ambition."
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It is political ambition that lies at the base of what R.

J. Rushdoony calls "the modern priestly state." 77

The unitary

conception of the indivisible sovereign state--or the sovereign
people--easily lends itself to ffinbition, even the ambition to do
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good.

78
Like most taxes, the income tax is not primarily a tax on the yield

or profit.

Apart from the variety of loopholes that tend to channel

investments and savings in highly structured ways, the basic tax itself
might best be described as a transaction tax, like sales and inheritance
taxes.

The mere act of transferring or receiving a good or service does

not itself constitute income and the exchange of one commodity for
another of equal market value does not generate income.

The real income

or profit that may result from a particular transaction derives from its
subsequent use as capital or from the "release of energy" it permits by
freeing capital for productive uses. 79
The point is this: the income tax is to an appreciable degree a tax
on productive capital.

As with so many regulatory devices, it often has

the effect of narrowing economic opportunities and channeling them
through public or officially approved agencies.
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To a large extent,

social and economic risks are shifted out of the marketplace and into
the political system itself where they are ultimately borne collectively
by the taxpayers.
even more insecure.

Life outside these regulated areas tends to become
Small businesses and farms are particularly

vulnerable to inflation and high interest rates.

But the hazards to

those inside these areas may be just as formidable if they raise costs
and reduce productivity.

The politicization of taxation, employment,

commerce, and so many other areas of social life is one consequence as
official programs and agencies provide new opportunities for making
friends, rewarding allies, and subduing foes.

As George J. Stigler has

pointed out: " With its power to prohibit or compel, to take or give
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money, the state can and does selectively help or hurt a vast number of
industries. 1181
The income tax, like other taxes on capital, is perhaps a better
mirror of human psychology than a measure of productivity or profit.
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The most characteristic features of the tax are its exemptions,
deductions, adjustments, and credits.

These betray its regulatory

purpose and effectively introduce an element of psychological
game-playing into the relationship between the people and their
governors.

John W. Burgess's appraisal of the motive behind the

Sixteenth Amendment sharply contrasts with that of Edwin Seligman:
The professional politicians were tumbling over each other to find
a popular issue. The redistribution of wealth by governmental
power was the winning idea of the day . . . and they framed this
Amendment to meet that idea. The masqueraded, indeed, under the
high-sounding patriotic principle that the Government should be
empowered to get adequate revenues in times of emergency. But they
were understood as they expected to be and intended to be. They
framed the crudest, most reckless bit of constitutional legislation
known to our history. It simply made waste paper of the
Constitution in respect to the relation of Government to ~he
8
constitutional rights of the Individual to his property.
An amorphous revenue-collecting and regulatory system evolved over
the years that has probably more than fulfilled Burgess's expectations.
Not only are its loopholes or incentives regulatory in purpose but, for
middle and lower income classes, they are also often disincentive in
effect.

They could not be better calculated to diminish productive

capital or better designed to control or subdue economic growth if such
were their purpose.
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Apart from information-gathering, redistribution,

or social control, this channeling of economic growth appears to be
their only possible utility.
The churches themselves must bear a considerable share of the
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burden if they cooperate with fiscal and monetary schemes that reflect
the techniques and ethics of a gambling casino.

The framers of the

Constitution had the palace intrigues of the urban courts of Europe
firmly in mind as they sought to provide constitutional safeguards
against political corruption.

But the centralization of the money

supply--whether in the form of the regulation of markets or some other
means--eventually brings every other area of social and economic life
into step behind it.

The church--of all institutions--has the least

excuse to allow itself to become a dependent of the state.

It is called

to a higher loyalty than either its own security or the changing
policies of the political regime.
The constitutionality of any law or policy should be considered
suspect if an exemption or exception is required in order to protect
religious liberty.

If liberty is only for those who wish it or claim

it, there is little to prevent its use as a carrot or a stick.
founders were suspicious of "energetic government."

The

Their intent was

that the state be limited by more substantial restraints than its own
lack of energy or ability.

Paper guarantees offer little protection in

a world of covenant breakers.

It was this recognitioon that led the

framers of the Constitution to devise safeguards in the form of checks
and balances within the framework of an institutional separation of
powers.

As Thomas Jefferson suggested, men must be bound by the chains

of the Constitution.

469

Notes
1

Address in Portland, Oregon, September 20, 1982.

2

see R. Alton Lee, A History of Regulatory Taxation (Lexington: The
University Press of Kentucky, 1973).
3

see Ronald L. Trowbridge, "HEW's Conduit Theory: Toward the
Abolishing of Privacy," Imprimis, July, 1981, pp. 1-6.
4
Daniel J. Elazar, "The Shaping of Intergovernmental Relations in
the Twentieth Century," Annals, 359 (May 1965): 10-22.
5This sentiment was once underscored by Justice Miller in Loan
Association v. Topeka, 20 Wall. 655, 663-64 (1875): "A striking instance
of the truth of the proposition is seen in the fact that the existing
tax of ten percent, imposed by the United States on the circulation of
all other banks than the National banks, drove out of existence every
State bank of circulation within a year or two after its passage . . . .
This power can be be employed against one class of individuals and in
favor of another, so as to ruin the one class and give unlimited wealth
wealth and prosperity to the other if there is no implied limitation of
the uses for which the power may be exercised . . . . [T]here can be no
lawful tax which is not laid for a public purpose." Similarly, the
Bible contains warnings about the use and abuse of financial power. For
example, Deut. 23:19-20; 24:14-15; Prov. 16:11; Is. 1 :21-25; Ezek.
22:23-31; Luke 16:13; Rev. 13:16-17. See Steven Alan Samson, "The
Character of Inflation," Biblical Economics Today, 6 (February/March
1983) : 3-4
0

6

Chester James Antieau, Phillip Mark Carroll, and Thomas Carroll
Burke, Religion Under the State Constitutions (Brooklyn: Central Book
Company, 1965), pp. 121-23.
7charles M. Whelan, "'Church' in the Internal Revenue Code: The
Definitional Problems," Fordham Law Review, 45 (March 1977): 904-05. In
accounting for much current church-state conflict on taxation, a factor
noted by Sharon Worthing is the concept of public accountability of
tax-exempt organizations: "At the root of the concept of 'public
accountability' is the notion that because tax-exempt organizations
exist to benefit the public, they are 'owned' by the public; and because
they do not pay taxes, they are 'subsidized' by the public. Because the
organization is 'public,' the public--i.e. the government--ought to have
information on the organization's activities." Sharon L. Worthing, "The
Potential in Recent Statutes for Government Surveillance of Religious
Organizations," p. 3. Paper presented at the Conference on Government
Intervention in Religious Affairs, Washington, D.C., February 11-13,

470
1981. Another factor, according to Elliott Wright of the National
Conference of Christians and Jews, is the favor being given the tax
expenditure theory of tax exemption by tax officials in preference to
the tax base theory. Personal conversation, September 27, 1983.
8

Peter L. Berger and Richard John Neuhaus, To Empower People: The
Role of Mediating Structures in Public Policy (Washington, D.C.:
American Enterprise Institute of Public Policy Research, 1977), p. 30,
quoted in Dean M. Kelly, "Confronting the Danger of the Moment," in
Church, State, and Public Policy: The New Shape of the Church-State
Debate, ed. Jay Mechling (Washington, D.C.: American Enterprise
Institute for Public Policy Research, 1978), p. 9, followed by this
candid assessment: "Franklin H. Littell expressed a similar view on one
of the few occasions he attended the Church-State Committee of the
American Civil Liberties Union. He said that, instead of fighting tax
exemption of churches, we ought to be doing everything possible to
strengthen churches and other voluntary associations against a
monopolistic, monolithic, pretotalitarian government."
9Glenn T. Miller, Religious Liberty in America: History and
Prospects (Philadelphia: The Westminster Press, 1976), p. 92.
10
11

Ibid., pp. 93-94.
Ibid., pp. 95-96.

12

carl Zollmann, "Religious Liberty in the American Law," Illinois
Law Review, 10 (1915): 198.
13

Paul G. Kauper and Stephen C. Ellis, "Religious Corporations and
the Law," Michigan Law Review, 14 (August 1 973) : 1504.
14

carl Zollmann, "Nature of American Religious Corporations,"
Michigan Law Review, 14 (1916): 37-38.
15

Ibid., p. 39.

16

carl Zollmann, "Tax Exemptions of American Church Property,"
Michigan Law Review, 14 (1916): 648; Zollmann, "Nature," pp. 38-39. The
major use of the new forms of corporation was to support manufacturing.
William E. Nelson, Americanization of the Common Law: The Impact of
Legal Change on Massachusetts Society, 1760-1830 (Cambridge: Harvard
University Press, 1975), p. 7, comments: "· . . this new form of
corporation was free from the restraints imposed by the ancient
requirement that a corporation serve community rather than private ends.
The rapid maturation of this new institution, of course, soon provided
men with a mechanism for amassing wealth and power that would totally
destroy the old economic order."
17 D. B. Robertson, Should Churches Be Taxed? (Philadelphia: The
Westminster Press, 1968), pp. 15, 57-61.

471
18

Ibid., pp. 59-60. The third point of the Veto Message of
February 21, 1811 opens with this observation: "The bill enacts into and
establishes by law sundry rules and proceedings relative purely to the
organization and policy of the church incorporated . . . . " Ibid., p.
59.
19

carl Zollmann, American Civil Church Law (New York: Columbia
University Press, 1917), p. 79.
20

The concept that taxation must be based on the consent of the
people through their elected representatives--expressed by John Locke,
James Otis, and leaders of the colonial resistance--was directed to this
object: that taxes would not be used oppressively or for private gain.
A delightful illustration of the principle--and the ease with which it
is violated--may be found in EdwardS. Ellis, comp., The Life of Colonel
David Crockett (Philadelphia: Porter & Coates, 1884), reprinted in "Not
Yours to Give," The Trinity Review, special issue.
21

Nelson, Americanization, pp. 15, 52; Rousas John Rushdoony, The
Nature of the American System (Fairfax, Va.: Thoburn Books, 1958), pp.
5-11 ' 159-60.
22

Anson Phelps Stokes, Church and State in the United States, vol.
3 (New York: Harper & Brothers, 1950), p. 419. Examples of complaints
over such zoning regulations--as opposed to other police powers--in
restricting religious activity may be found in Religious Freedom
Reporter, 3 (July 1983): 185-86, in which a New Jersey appeals court
ruled that the holding of church services in a private residence
violated a zoning ordinance; and Religious Freedom Reporter, 3 (June
1983): 155, in which a New York state trial court overruled a village
effort to regulate church activities in advance through zoning
ordinance. See also Paige Comstock Cunningham, "Zoning Ordinances,
Private Religious Conduct, and the Free Exercise of Religion,"
Northwestern University Law Review, 76 (1981 ): 786-812; Rushdoony,
Nature, pp. 57-60.
23

David Riesman, Nathan Glazer, and Reuel Denney, The Lonely
Crowd: A Study of the Changing American Character, abridged (Garden
City, N.Y.: Doubleday & Company, 1953), pp. 28-40. See also Corinne
Lathrop Gilb, Hidden Hierarchies: The Professions and Government (New
York: Harper & Row, 1966), pp. 3-24, for an extension of Sir Henry
Maine's thesis that civilization proceeds from status to contract. Gilb
sees a swing of the pendulum back toward status relationships through
bureaucratization, which created a new basis for social unification.
She cites as examples the creation of church associations and the
introduction of the civil service. Ibid., p. 15.
24
25

Zollmann, "Nature," p.44.

Zollmann, "Tax Exemptions," pp. 646-47.
86' 88 ( 1853) .

See Orr v. Baker, 4 Ind.

472
26

Leo Pfeffer, Church, State, and Freedom, revised ed. (Boston:
Beacon Press, 1967), pp. 217-18. Pfeffer notes that similar positions
were adopted by The Christian Century and the United Presbyterian
Church. Ibid., p. 215.
27

Robert F. Drinan, Religion, the Courts, and Public Policy (New
York: McGraw-Hill Book Company, 1963), p. 9.
28

Zollmann, "Tax Exemptions," p. 648.

29

Peter Swords, Charitable Real Property Tax Exemptions in New York
State: Menace or Measure of Social Progress? (New York: Association of
the Bar of the City of New York, 1981 ), p. 70.
30

See Charles A. Barker, American Convictions: Cycles of Public
Thought, 1600-1850 (Philadelphia: J. P. Lippincott Company, 1970), pp.
444-52; Alice Felt Tyler, Freedom's Ferment: Phases of American Social
History to 1860 (Minneapolis: The University of Minnesota Press, 1944),
pp. 351-77.
31
32

Robertson, Churches, p. 65.
Ibid., pp. 69-88.

33

Monrad G. Paulsen, "Preferment of Religious Institutions in Tax
and Labor Legislation," Law and Contemporary Problems, 14 (Winter,
1949): 148, quoted in Pfeffer, Freedom, p. 217.
34

Dean M. Kelley, Why Churches Should Not Pay Taxes (New York:
Harper & Row, 1977), pp. 93-94.
35

Americans United members--including Paul Blanshard, Joseph Martin
Dawson, Martin A. Larson, C. Stanley Lowell, John A. Mackay, and Frank
H. Yost--have provoked controversy with their publications from the
beginning of the organization in 1947. See C. Stanley Lowell, Embattled
Wall: Americans United: An Idea and a Man (Washington, D.C.: Americans
United, 1966); Lawrence P. Creedon and William D. Falcon, United for
Separation: An Analysis of POAU Assaults on Catholicism (Milwaukie: The
Bruce Publishing Company, 1959). Americans United was one of the
litigants in Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602 (1971 ), in which the Court
ruled unctonstitutional a Pennsylvania statute authorizing the
Superintendent of Public Instruction to "purchase . . . secular
educational services" from church-related schools. See C. Stanley
Lowell, The Great Church-State Fraud (Washington, D.C.: Robert B. Luce,
1973), pp. 128-30. The Committee for Public Education and Religious
Liberty was involved in three important parochial school aid cases that
reached the Supreme Court. It won the Nyquist and Levitt cases, but
lost the Regan case in 1980.
36

Edwin R. A. Seligman, The Income Tax: A Study of the History,
Theory, and Practice of Income Taxation at Home and Abroad (New York:
The Macmillan Company, 1911 ), pp. 3-22, 399-406.

473
37

Ibid., pp. 430, 435-40, 482-93, 586-89. See Pollock v. Farmers'
Loan and Trust Company, 158 U.S. 601 (1895), in which the Court held
that the income tax was a direct tax that must be apportioned according
to representation in Congress.
38

The Supreme Court upheld the constitutionality of the act in
Brushaber v. Union Pacific Railroad Company, 240 U.S. 1 (1916).
39 Henry C. Simons, Personal Income Taxation: The Definition of
Income as a Problem of Public Policy (Chicago: The University of Chicago
Press, 1938), p. 39.
4

°Kelley, Churches, pp. 22-23, 70-71. For a discussion of changing
judicial attitudes towards the use of the taxing power as a regulating
power, see Alpheus Thomas Mason and William M. Beaney, American
Constitutional Law: Introductory Essays and Selected Cases, 6th ed.
(Englewood Cliffs, N.J.: Prentice-Hall, 1978), pp. 310-15. Although
innumerable "anomalies" can be cited with regard to which organizations
pass muster with regard to various stipulations, it might be more
accurate to view the "anomalies" as indicative of a manipulative
purpose. It may be instructive to consider some of the political
activist organizations that receive exemptions as charitable or
educational organizations. See, for example, Haven Bradford Gow, "Tax
Status Challenged," Liberty, May/June, 1981, p. 9.
41

sharon L. Worthing, "The Internal Revenue Service as a Monitor of
Church Institutions: The Excessive Entanglement Problem," Fordham Law
Review, 45 (March 1977): 931.
42

Ibid., pp. 946, 947.

43

Ibid., pp. 947, 948. Elias Clark also dealt with the imposition
of legal controls over charitable organizations. He regarded them as
obstacles to growth and suggested that "as the trend toward the welfare
state continues apace, it presages a steady shrinking of areas open to
charity.'' Elias Clark, "The Limitation on Political A~tivities: A
Discordant Note in the Law of Charities," Virginia Law Review, 46
(1960): 466. See also William P. Thompson, "Churches, Public Issues,
and Tax Exemption," Taxation and the Free Exercise of Religion
(Washington, D.C.: Baptist Joint Committee on Public Affairs, 1978), p.
56.
44

Ibid., pp. 934-35. Controversy has resulted from disagreements
over what is "religious" and what is "secular." In 1982, the Supreme
Court summarily affirmed Rusk v. Espinosa, 634 F.2d 477 (10th Cir.
1 980) , affirmed, 456 U.S. 951 ( 1 982) , in which a charitable
solicitations ordinance was ruled to violate the First Amendment: "The
setting up of a city agency to make distinctions as to that which is
religious and that which is secular so as to subject the latter to
regulations is necessarily a suspect effort." Whether an exemption is
considered a privilege or an immunity, the very similar actions of IRS
must also be considered constitutionally suspect. For several years,

474
various Lutheran groups have disputed IRS's narrow conception of the
religious mission of the church and have refused to file information
returns. A suit has been filed in federal court by Lutheran Social
Service of Minnesota to recover penalties assessed against it for
failing to file Form 990. Religious Freedom Reporter, 3 (July 1983):
188. See also Elliott Wright, "Lutherans Dispute I.R.S. on 'Integrated
Auxiliaries,"' TR.axis, 1 (July-August 1981): 3, published by the
National Conference of Christians and Jews. The distinctions made
within the Internal Revenue Code itself fall into fifteen separate
categories, according to Charles Whelan, about which there is much
disagreement. Most attention has centered on the revisions in §6033 of
the Code made by the Tax Reform Act of 1969. As amended, the section
distinguishes between "churches, their integrated auziliaries, and
conventions or associations of churches," which are not required to file
annual returns, and various other religion organization, which must
file. For a legislative history, see Charles M. Whelan, "'Church' in
the Internal Revenue Code: The Definitional Problems," Fordham Law
Review, 45 (March 1977): 885-928.
45

Robert McCurry, "Court Orders Church to Give All Records to
I.R.S.--Sanctions State Church," Temple Times, December 27, 1981,
pp. 1-4; Robert McCurry, "Supreme Court Sanctions IRS Approved State
Church," Temple Times, December 12, 1982, pp. 1-3; Religious Freedom
Reporter, 2 (September 1982): 264. Among the factors considered in
determining whether a church will be recognized are: 1) affiliation with
a recognized denomination; 2) numerical size; 3) proper organization and
incorporation; 4) engagement in acceptable religious activities. The
Circuit Court ruled that the IRS has an ''inquisitorial function that is
akin to that of a grand jury, and no 'probable cause' is necessary
before a summons is issued." It also asserted the following: "It is
necessary and proper for the IRS to survey all the activities of a
church." This entitles it to examine financial records to determine if
"the pastor is receiving an unreasonable or excessive salary," which was
put at 10% of the church's gross income. The classification of
religious organizations along with charitable, scientific, and
educational organizations under §501 (c) (3) of the Internal Revenue Code
practically subjects them to the same regulations that apply to the
others. The entanglements have been unobtrusive for the most part. But
see Chapter Twelve, especially note 20. See also McCurry, ''Supreme
Court," p. 2; Alan Stang, "What the War Is Really About," Christianity
and Civilization, 2 (1983): 24-39. Richard R. Hammar, Pastor, Church,
and Law (Springfield, Mo.: Gospel Publishing House, 1983), p. 353,
comments: "Churches, like any other exempt organization, have the burden
of proving that they meet each of the prerequisites to exempt status.
The burden of proof is not on the IRS to disprove eligibility for exempt
status." On this assumption, there is no good reason why churches do
not file information returns if no legal protection is afforded them
against administrative "fishing expeditions." Furthermore, this
exercise by a statutory creation--possessing only dedicated powers--of a
power vested in the citizenry itself--that of the grand jury--radically
undercuts the constitutional separat~on of powers safeguard. The old
legal maxim--which is now riddled with exceptions--was that "delegated

475
powers may not be delegated."
46

"Mennonite Church Denied Exemption Because of Medical Plan,"
Gammon & Grange Nonprofit Newsletter, March 3, 1983, p. 2. The case,
Bethel Conservative Mennonite Church v. Commissioner, was decided in Tax
Court on February 7, 1983. See also "Church Loses Tax-Exemption for Not
Submitting Records," Gammon & Grange Nonprofit Religious Liberty
Newsletter, August 1983, p. 12. The case was Basic Bible Church of
America v. Commissioner, Tax Court, May 24, 1983. Similar demands have
also been sent to Calvary Temple, East Point, Georgia; Church of
Christian Liberty, Prospect Heights, Illinois; Lord's Covenant Church,
Scottsdale, Arizona. See Robert McCurry, "IRS Seeks to 'Approve'
Calvary Temple Ministries," Temple Times, January 29, 1978, pp. 1-3.
Calvary Temple was sent two questionnaires, the first of which directed
31 questions regarding the church, its membership, organization, and
finances. The second related to its Christian school. See also Robert
McCurry, "I.R.S. Subpoenas Calvary Temple Records," Temple Times,
January 17, 1982, pp. 1-3. The Church of Christian Liberty is the home
of Christian Liberty Academy and numerous satellite schools through a
home-study program it developed. A letter from Dr. Philip E. Bennett,
May 23, 1981, states: "The IRS is no longer threatening court action.
What they simply are saying, in effect, is that unless CCL complies with
their ungodly demands, the IRS will begin to notify the local state
authorities to begin taxing all church property (parsonage, Church
buildings, school playground, etc.). And no contributions to the Church
will be deductible as the IRS 'will treat your organization as a taxable
entity' (quote from IRS letter)." On May 11, 1983, Rep. Mickey Edwards
of Oklahoma introduced H.R. 2977, the Church Audit Procedures Act and
Sen. Charles Grassley introduced it into the Senate as S. 1262. But
this well-meaning effort to eliminate "fishing expeditions" will also
sanction IRS investigation of churches. On regulatory uses of the
auditing power, see John W. Whitehead, The Stealing of America
(Westchester, Ill.: Crossway Books, 1983), pp. 102-105. On the
classification tests used by IRS, see Kenneth E. Peacock, "Emerging
Criteria for Tax-Exempt Classification for Religious Organizations,"
Taxes--The Tax Magazine, January, 1982, pp. 61-65.
47

Dean Kelley, "Theories of Tax Exemption," TR.axis 1 (May/June
1982): 6. The definitive statement of the tax expenditure theory is by
Stanley S. Surrey. See Stanley S. Surrey, Pathways to Tax Reform: The
Concept of Tax Expenditures (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1973).
One writer has commented: "In the United States, federal tax policy
illustrates the government's unconscious rush to be the god of its
citizens. When a provision in the tax laws permits the taxpayer to keep
a portion of his money, the Internal Revenue Service calls this a 'tax
expenditure,' or an 'implicit government grant.' This is not tax money
that the state has collected and expended but money it has allowed the
citizen to keep by not taking it. In other words, any words, any money
the citizen is permitted to keep is regarded as if the state had
graciously given it to him. Everything we have is from the state, to
which we owe gratitude. In fact, we are the property of the state,
which therefore has the right to the fruit of our labor." Herbert

476
Schlossberg, Idols for Destruction: Christian Faith and Its
Confrontation with American Society (Nashville: Thomas Nelson
Publishers, 1983), p. 187. A logical consequence of this attitutde is
that various stipulations are attached to tax exemptions, credits, or
deductions of any sort: for example, compliance with public policy. See
also Richard John Neuhaus, Christian Faith and Public Policy: Thinking
and Acting in the Courage of Uncertainty (Minneapolis: Augsburg
Publishing House, 1977), pp. 172-73: "The relatively recent notion of
'tax expenditure' should be viewed with great caution. It comes close
to implying that the whole of society's income and wealth is, in
principle, subject to the state's direction. Any income or wealth,
therefore, that is 'exempted' is to be viewed as an expenditure by the
state in furtherance of the state's purposes. A corollary says, 'That
which the state funds (by 'tax expenditure') the state ought to
control.' This direction, pushed far enough and consistently enough,
has troubling and even totalitarian implications that could be in
serious conflict with the democratic pluralism of American society."
Neuhaus also upholds the tax exemptions of churches as a matter of right
and recognizes the need for careful definition of what is meant by the
church and its property or income. An even greater need is a careful
definition of the state and its powers and limitations.
48

Ibid., p. 6. It should be noted that support for this theory may
even be found among proponents of church exemptions. For example, Paul
J. Weber and Dennis A. Gilbert, Private Churches and Public Money:
Church-Government Fiscal Relations, Contributions to the Study of
Religion, Number 1 (Westport, Conn.: Greenwood Press, 1981 ), pp. 181-90.
The authors argue for "fiscal neutrality," which would entail the filing
of information returns, end restrictions on political activity, and
treat religious organizations like any other nonprofit organizations.
The placement of a California church into receivership by the
application of the charitable public trust doctrine indicates one place
this proposal might lead. See Morton B. Jackson, "Socialized Religion:
California's Public Trust Theory," Philanthropy Monthly, October 1980,
pp. 15-24; Dean M. Kelley, "A Church in Receivership: California's
Unique Theory of Church and State," The Christian Century, June 18-25,
1980, pp. 669-72. Sen. Nicholas Petris introduced legislation that
repealed a section of the Nonprofit Corporation Code used to put the
Worldwide Church of God under receivership, but the common law doctrine
that charitable funds--including church donations--are public funds is
far from dead, judging by the Supreme Court's citation of the English
common law of charities in Bob Jones University v. United States, 103
S.Ct. 2017 ( 1983).
49 Boris I. Bittker, "Churches, Taxes and the Constitution," The
Yale Law Journal, 78 (July 1969): 1285. This argument lends litt~aid
or comfort to supporters of any particular exemption. Opponents of
exemptions focus on the genuine problem of the shrinking tax base, but
often fail to address the larger dimensions of the problem. Adding
churches to the tax rolls is unlikely to reduce the overall burden of
high property taxes, which are tied to the push and pull of growing
budgets, inflation, wage schedules, unemployment, and housing. For a

477
treatment of the inequities of the present system--which nevertheless
fails to challenge its assumptions--see Martin A. Larson and C. Stanley
Lowell, The Religious Empire: The Growth and Danger of Tax-Exempt
Property in the United States (Washington, D.C.: Robert B. Luce Co.,
1976). Arguments made against exemptions or for restrictions are often
made by churchmen. See Alfred Balk, The Religion Business ( Richrnond,
Va.: John Knox Press, 1968).
50

Justice Jackson was citing his own oplnlon in Wickard v. Filburn,
317 U.S. 111, 131 (1942), which upheld the wheat marketing quota
provisions of the Agricultural Adjustment Act of 1938. The
constitutional distinction between commerce and production was
discarded. See Edward Jerome, The Problem of the Constitution (London:
Longmans, Green and Co., 1939), pp. 1-5, 160-86. Jerome maintained that
the Constitution provides that the regulation of production be under the
exclusive control of state government. See also Alfred H. Kelly and
Winfred A. Harbison, The American Constitution: Its Origins and
Development, 5th ed. (New York: W. W. Norton & Co., 1976), pp. 729-30.
This ruling and the earlier decision in Ashwander v. Tennessee Valley
Authority, 297 U.S. 288 (1976), in effect expanded what Edward Gaffney
has called "the plenary power of the Congress to regulate commerce among
the several states . . . . " Edward McGlynn Gaffney, Jr., "Biblical
Religion and Constitutional Adjudication on a Secularized Society,"
Mercer Law Review, 31 (1980): 434.
51

see "The New Social Security Law and Christian Schools," The
Ram's Horn (Buckeye Christian School Association, Lima, Ohio), --September, 1983, pp. 2-3. A number of fundamentalist leaders met in
September, 1983 to form the American Coalition of Unregistered Churches
to resist the new tax. Robert McCurry, "Pastors and Churches Across
America Are Beginning to Wake Up and Stand Up," Temple Times, October 9,
1983, pp. 1-2. See Public Law 98-21, April 20, 1983.
52

such a statute has been proposed in Oregon several times but has
failed each time, most recently as HB 2708.
53 Arvo Van Al t
s yne, "T ax Exemp t·lon o f Ch urc h Proper t y, " Oh"lO St a t e
Law Journal, 20 (1959): 461.
54
55

Ibid., p. 505.
Ibid., p. 505.

56

See, for example, Ira Katznelson and Mark Kesselman, The Politics
of Power: A Critical Introduction to American Government, 2nd ed. (New
York: Harcourt Brace Jovanovich, 1979), pp. 372-76; Matthew Edel, "Urban
Renewal and Land Use Conflicts," in Problems in Political Economy: An
Urban Perspective, ed. David M. Gordon (Lexington, Mass.: D. C. Heath
and Company, 1977), pp. 519-27.
57 on the problems engendered by land use regulation in general, see
Peter Hall, Harry Gracey, Ray Drewett, and Ray Thomas, The Containment

478
of Urban England, vol. 2: The Planning System: Objectives, Operations,
Impacts (London: George Allen & Unwin, 1973), pp. 390-409, which shows
the effects of post-war British land use planning and how it contributed
to suburbanization, exorbitant real estate prices, and racial and
economic class apartheid. See also Ken Auletta, "Who's to Blame for the
Fix We're In," New York, October 27, 1975, pp. 29-41, on the effects of
proliferating agencies and programs on the solvency of NevJ York City;
Julian L. Simon, "The Farmer and the Mall: Are America's Farmlands
Disappearing?" The American Spectator, August 1982, pp. 18-20, 40-41,
which disputes the data used to justify land use controls. On the
effects of property taxation, see Robert Cassidy, "The Trouble With
Property Taxes," The New Republic, May 15, 1971 , pp. 15-16.
58

california, Office of the Attorney General, Opinion of George
Deukmejian, No. 79-508, November 9, 1979. See also California Council
for Religious Freedom, An Analysis of the Attorney General's Opinion
Regarding the Requirement of Churches and Church Schools to File Tax
Exempt Forms (Fairfield, Cal.: n. p., 1979).
59 california, Exempt Organization Annual Information Statement,
Form 199B, Income Year 1978. See Form FTB 3509 (10-77), Part III,
"Public Charities--Election to make expenditures to influence
legislation," which includes the following: "NOTE: An election is not
permitted if you a church, an integrated auxiliary of a church or a
private foundation. State and federal law is the same with regard to
this election, except that State law does not provide for an excise tax
on excess lobbying."
60

california, Franchise Tax Board. Letter dated March 17, 1980.
Original letter from Ray R. Morawski is dated February 5, 1980,
Fundamental Baptist Church, Santa Maria.
61

california, Exempt Organization Annual Information Statement,
Form 199B, Income Year 1980.
62

Dean M. Kelley, "A Church in Receivership: California's Unique
Theory of Church and State," The Christian Century, June 18-25, 1980,
pp. 669-72; ~erry Wiley, ''Post-Guyana Hysteria: State of California
Occupies Headquarters of the Worldwide Church of God," Liberty,
May/June, 1979; Jeanne Rayphand, "Does Court Ordered Receivership Breach
the Wall of Separation Between Church and State?" Western State
University Law Review, 6 (1979): 269-79. Nontraditional religious cults
have been the focus nf much of the controversy but the handling of these
disputes about practices, tax exemptions, and property have spillover
effects that influence official and public attitudes about religious
liberty in general. For an account by one of the principal figures in
the case, see Stanley R. Rader, Against the Gates of Hell: The Threat to
Religious Freedom in America (New York: Everest House, 1980). For an
account of a long-standing conflict involving Scientology, Inc., and
several federal agencies, written by a journalist, see Omar V. Garrison,
Playing Dirty: The Secret War Against Beliefs (Los Angeles:
Ralston-Pilot, 1980).

479
63

"Petris Criticizes Deukmejian for Dropping Two Church Suits,"
Oakland Tribune, 17 October 1980, p. C-16; "Dual Attack on Deukmejian,"
San Francisco Chronicle, 17 October 1980; Peg Brickley, "California
Attorney General's Surveillance Power Curbed," Liberty,
November/December, 1980, pp. 21-23; Jerry Wiley, "California Attorney
General Capitulates--or Does He?" Liberty, January/February, 1981, pp.
26-27. Earlier, Justice William Rehnquist had denied a request for a
stay of an order by a district court denying a preliminary injunction
sought by Synanon against action by the Attorney General. Synanon
Foundation, Inc. v. California, 100 S.Ct. 496 (1979).
64

Personal conversations with Rev. Harry Jackson, Fairfield; Rev.
R. J. Rushdoony, Vallecito; and Rev. Hans Nikoley, Poway. Letter from
Harry D. Jackson, California Council for Religious Freedom, December 1,
1982. See Assembly Bill 1134, 1983 Cal. Stats., was signed into law
July 18, 1983. Religious Freedom Reporter, 3 (September 1983): 253.
Sen. Richardson's S. 1275, 1983 Cal. Stats., ch. 120, was signed into
law June 22, 1983. Religious Freedom Reporter, 3 (August 1983): 216-17.
65

Cord, Separation, pp. 49-82; Pfeffer, Freedom, p. 184.

66

Justice Rutledge characterized the Bradfield ruling's reasoning
as "highly artificial" in his dissent in Everson, 330 U.S. 1, 28 (1947).
67

Pfeffer, Freedom, pp. 200-01. Other examples are examined in
Donald A. Giannella, "Religious Liberty, Nonestablishment, and Doctrinal
Development," Harvard Law Review, 81 (January 1968): 554-60.
68

Ibid., pp. 202-04.

69 Lyle E. Schaller, The Churches' War on Poerty (Nashville:
Abington Press, 1967), p. 78.
70

David E. Kucharsky, "Passing the Plate to Washington,"
Christianity Today, August 18, 1967, pp. 15-16.
71

Schaller, Churches' War, p. 80.

72

Arthur Herzog, The Church Trap (New York: The Macmillan Company,
1968), p. 123.
73

"Federal Aid: Too Many Strings?" Time, April 24, 1978, pp. 73-74;
Belden Menkus, "Federal Aid for Christian Colleges: Money Is the Tie
That Binds," Christianity Today, November 6, 1981, pp. 52-53; Daniel
Patrick Moynihan, "State vs. Academe," Harper's, December 1980, pp.
31-40.
74

Robertson, Churches, p. 234.

75 Ibid., p. 234.
76 Alexander Hamilton, John Jay, and James Madison, The Federalist:

480
A Commentary on the Constitution of the United States (New York: The
Modern Library, n.d.), pp. 335-41.
77 Rousas John Rushdoony, Politics of Guilt and Pity (Fairfax, Va.:
Thoburn Press, 1978), p. 291. The "priestly state" has ancient roots,
as such historical examples as ancient Egypt, Babylon, and the Inca
Empire testify. In Spain's American colonies, the secular government
had power to grant permission to erect churches, control by license the
importation of clergy, appoint bishops, fix the boundaries of
episcopacies, reprimand priests, collect taxes, control religious
communications, and settle disputes. William George Torpey, Judicial
Doctrines of Religious Rights in America (Chapel Hill: The University of
North Carolina Press, 1948), p. 7.
78

see, generally, Hymen Ezra Cohen, Recent Theories of Sovereignty
(Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 1937). Cohen concluded with
a prediction: "The theories of 'sovereignty' may disappear with changes
in terminology; but the substance of sovereignty will remain so long as
the problems of social control divide men into rulers and ruled, into
leaders and led." Ibid., p. 148. Chief Justice Marshall dealt with the
subject of the divided and limited sovereignties associated with the
federal constitutional system in McCulloch v. Maryland, 4 Wheat. 316
(1819). Following the Civil War, an expansion of national powers has
been generally asserted or assumed. Seligman's argument for graduated
income taxes, for example, was based on an assumption of national
sovereignty, which was consistent with his desire to have income taxes
administered by the central government. See Seligman, Income Tax, pp.
649-55.
79 The term "release of energy" was used by
James Willard Hurst, to refer to the nineteenth
legal revolution. James Willard Hurst, Law and
Freedom in the Nineteenth-Century United States
of Wisconsin Press, 1956), p. 32.
80

the legal historian,
century capitalistic
the Conditions of
(Madison: The University

Walter E. Williams contends that a host of politically-motivated
interventions into the economic marketplace tend to exclude the most
disadvantaged groups. Walter E. Williams, The State Against Blacks (New
York: McGraw-Hill Book Company, 1982), p. 72: "The Dorsey study
concludes that the occupational licensing of cosmetologists: (1) screens
out people on the basis of characteristics unrelated to job performance;
and (2) causes an overinvestment in education and formal training . .
In addition, licensing serves to reinforce handicaps suffered by
disadvantaged minorities." This raises the initial capital outlay. A
comparable economic effect may be obtained by reducing the available
capital for investment, as by a tax on the capital. Such a tax
structure can be sustained politically only by introducing various
supplementary incentives and benefits, including social welfare
programs, few of which offer much opportunity become independent from
them. See Frances Fox Piven and Richard A. Cloward, Regulating the
Poor: The Functions of Public Welfare (New York: Vintage Books, 1971 ),
pp. 341-48.

481
81

George J. Stigler, The Citizen and the State: Essays on
Regulation (Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 1975), p. 114.
See R. M. Hartwell, "Introduction," in The Politicization of Society,
ed. Kenneth S. Templeton, Jr. (Indianapolis: Liberty Press, 1979), p.
14: "Politicization can be defined as that now pervasive tendency for
making all questions political questions, all issues political issues,
all values political values, and all decisions political decisions." In
a general way, all questions are political but what has changed is the
degree to which the sphere of direct legislative and administrative
regulation has expanded. The use of political office to win friends and
influence people is nothing new, of course, and the vast bureaucracy
cprovides additional opportunities for political tradeoffs. The high
cost of winning political office is indicative the high value that
contributors place on political influence. Lobbying and campaign
contributions by regulated industries and public employees'
organizations are major factors in electoral contests. Because of the
possibilities for corruption, elaborate campaign finance reforms have
been introduced, but it is not clear that they have done anything more
than alter and even multiply the channels for using public power on
behalf of private interests. New regulations are often designed to curb
abuses engendered by earlier regulations and subsidies. The liaisons
between public power and private interest are many and varied, as
illustrated by railroad rights-of-way, mineral depletion allowances,
general laws favoring local wines and cheeses, the revolving personnel
door between regulatory agencies and regulated industries, and the
leasing or restriction of public lands for purposes that range from
cattle grazing to mining. See also Chapter Eleven, note 35.
82

Envy--which is akin to what Nietzsche called ressentiment--and
guilt are among the psychological factors that some critics have seen
underlying the system. Besides Burgess, see Helmut Schoeck, Envy: A
Theory of Social Behavior (New York: Harcourt, Brace & World, 1966), pp.
250-51, 306-08. Frederick Bastiat claimed over a century ago that
modern political economy is based on "legal plunder." Frederick
Bastiat, The Law, trans. Dean Russell (Irvington-on-Hudson, N.Y.: The
Foundation for Economic Education, Inc., 1950). The economic historian,
Gary North, also suggests a strong psychological component in
economic--and tax--policy. "Modern politics is based on the systematic
manipulation of guilt. In fact, without guilt feelings, the whole
modern political structure would collapse. If the State passes enough
laws, so that everyone has to break many of the daily--sometimes
competing Federal bureaucracies mandate mutually contradictory
requirements--then the bureaucrats can make people feel guilty
constantly. They feel guilty, and they fear exposure. This makes even
more manipulation necessary, for people seek salvation through political
action." Gary North, Successful Investing in an Age of Envy (Sheridan,
Ind.: Stedman Press, 1981), p. 18. North sees the problem, which is
often treated solely as a political or economic one, as fundamentally
moral and theological in nature: "The tax revolt will not work. You
cannot wipe away two generations of bad theology with a few years of
political hoopla. If we see a few taxes cut, of the budget balanced
(officially), then the off-budget Federal agencies will multiply like

482
flies . . . and the Federal Reserve System will buy up private debt
(laundered through some modern version of the Reconstruction Finance
Corporation) with fiat money. The modern theology of guilt-atoning
taxation will destroy the dollar . . . . The tax revolt will only hasten
the demise of the dollar, and every other fiat currency in the West. To
have a successful tax revolt, we have to find a way to deal with the
problem of real guilt, and the State (as well as the anti-State) cannot
rectify the problem of guilt." Ibid., p. 19. "Fiat currency" has long
meant paper currency without backing in gold or silver. See Andrew
Dickson White, Fiat Money Inflation in France (Irvington-on-Hudson,
N.Y.: The Foundation for Economic Education, 1959), which was first
publicly read before members of Congress in 1876. White contended that
the inflationary policies of the National Assembly in 1790 contributed
to the downfall of the ancien regime.
83

John W. Burgess, The Reconciliation of Government with Liberty
(New York: Charles Scribner's Sons, 1915), pp. 368-69.
84

After analyzing Lester Ward's model for a planned society, Gary
North suggested that "The purpose of State interference is to make
business unprofitable." Gary North, The Dominion Covenant: Genesis
(Tyler, Tex.: Institute for Christian Economics), p. 303.

